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An enduring challenge for the policy and political sciences is valid and reliable depiction 
of policy designs. One emerging approach for dissecting policy designs is the application of 
Elinor Ostrom and Sue Crawford’s institutional grammar tool (1995; 2005). The grammar tool 
offers a method to identify systematically the core elements that comprise policies, including 
target audiences, expected patterns of behavior, and formal modes of sanctioning for 
noncompliance. This paper provides three contributions to the study of policy designs by 
developing and applying the institutional grammar tool. First, we provide revised guidelines for 
applying the institutional grammar tool to the study of policy design. Second, an additional 
component to the grammar, called the object, is introduced. Third, we apply the modified 
grammar tool to four policies that shape Colorado State Aquaculture to demonstrate its 
effectiveness and utility in uncovering practical and theoretical patterns within policies. The 
conclusion summarizes the contributions of the paper as well as points to future research and 
applications of the institutional grammar tool. 
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Introduction 
 
One of the enduring challenges in the study of policy designs is creating a systematic way 
to organize and understand the minute elements that comprise their content. Past typologies and 
categorizations have been criticized for failing to provide a valid and reliable instrument for 
inquiry (Lowi, 1972; Wilson, 1979; Eulau, 1969; Froman, 1967).  To address a lack of 
conceptual clarity for understanding the formal institutions that govern social situations, 
Crawford and Ostrom (1995; 2005) devised an institutional grammar to illustrate the similarities 
and differences of rules, norms, and strategies as well as to “clarify the distinct influences of 
each kind of institutional statement [i.e. rules, norms, strategies] on human interaction in diverse 
action situations” (Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 137).  
While the institutional grammar proposed by Crawford and Ostrom (1995; 2005) is 
useful for its conceptual insight, it does not offer clear guidelines for implementation or 
empirical application (Basurto et al. 2009; Schluter and Theesfeld forthcoming).  Basurto et al., 
(2009) moved Crawford and Ostrom’s grammar closer to realization as a policy design tool. 
Basurto et al. showcased the promise of the institutional grammar as an analytical tool in the 
analysis of two policy designs, one for transportation and the other abortion.  They also 
indentified the main unresolved challenges for implementation, which can also help to advance 
the work of scholars interested in applying the institutional grammar, for example, as a tool for 
the analysis of legislation (Speer 2008) or the simulation of endogenous rule changes in agent 
based modeling scenarios (Smajgl et al. 2008).  
In this paper we start to respond to some of the most important challenges identified by 
Basurto et al. (2009) by: (1) Proposing an additional syntactic component to the grammar—the 
oBject —in order to reduce ambiguity, increase inter-coder reliability, and expand the scope of 
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possibilities for researchers when conducting nested and configuration analyses relating to the 
institutional grammar. (2) Revising the guidelines originally proposed by Basurto et al. (2009) 
for coding the grammar; and (3) Conducting an empirical analysis of Colorado State aquaculture 
legislation to illustrate some of the new analytical possibilities that emerge through these 
improvements.  
The goal of this paper is to re-introduce the institutional grammar and then to provide a 
proof of concept in an empirical application. This paper proceeds in two parts.  The first part 
provides an overview of the IAD necessary to understand the conceptual origin of the 
(institutional grammar tool) IGT.  This section is largely definitional and introduces revisions to 
the grammar to ease the validity and reliability of its application.  The second part is empirical 
where we illustrate the use of the grammar with an application of Colorado aquaculture.  The 
conclusion discusses the future applications of the IGT, which can be applied within IAD-guided 
research as well as research guided by other frameworks and theories seeking understanding and 
explanations as to how the components of policy designs evolve over time, compare across 
designs, or shape and are shaped by policy processes. 
IAD Framework and the Institutional Grammar Tool 
 The IAD framework has two main features of interest: a) it views collective action 
situations as composed of the same set of elements or working parts, where b) multiple action 
situations exist at any one level of analysis and at various nested levels. The structure of 
opportunities and constraints available to actors engaged in action situations at one level are 
assumed to be a product of interactions between actors in situations at higher and lower levels 
(Ostrom, 2005, 58). The IAD explicitly recognizes three functional levels of analysis: the 
constitutional level, the collective-choice level, and the operational level. Clearly, the actual 
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number of levels relevant to each setting will vary. But functionally the IAD identifies the 
operational level, as where the day-to-day interactions take place among agents and the 
prescriptions they develop to affect such interactions and their outcomes. At the collective-
choice level, we observe the interactions and prescriptions that affect operational activities and at 
the constitutional level the focus is on those prescriptions that in turn affect rules, norms or 
strategies governing collective-choice arenas (Ostrom 2005, 58). 
An action situation is the social space where “participants with diverse preferences 
interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight” (among 
the many things that individuals can do in such domains) (Ostrom 2005, 14).1 The outputs of 
action situations2 that result in prescriptions to organize repeated interactions are defined as 
institutions (Ostrom et al. 1994, 28). Such prescriptions can be in the form of new rules, norms, 
and strategies, to govern their future interactions. Thus3, rules are the “shared prescriptions 
(must, must not, may) that are mutually understood and predictably enforced in particular 
situations by agents responsible for monitoring conduct and for imposing sanctions” (Ostrom, 
2007, 23). Norms are the “shared prescriptions that tend to be enforced by the participants 
themselves through internally and externally imposed costs and inducements” (Ostrom, 2007, 
23).  Strategies represent the “regularized plans that individuals make within the structure of 
                                                           
1
 The social space itself is conceptualized as an action situation, and the action situation together with participants 
constitute an action arena. For the purposes of this paper it suffices to only use the term action situation. For a more 
detailed description and nuanced conceptualization of each term—as well as the IAD as a whole—see Ostrom 
(2005). 
2
 All action situations are conformed by the same clusters of variables, and thus what results from the immense 
number of ways the clusters of variables combine with each other is the large variety of action situations that we 
observe in the world everyday. Describing the different working parts of an action situation is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Please refer to Ostrom (2005) to a detailed description of each of them. 
3
 We make this remark because under the IAD tradition, there is a clear conceptual distinction between frameworks, 
theories and models (Ostrom 2007, 25). But also because in contrast to the definition of rules, norms and strategies 
provided here, the one provided under the grammar of institutions is much narrower in scope to fit the micro 
institutional scale under which the grammar operates. 
  
 
5 
 
incentives produced by rules, norms, and expectations of the likely behavior of others in a 
situation affected by relevant physical and material conditions” (Ostrom, 2007, 23). 
The IAD is a framework designed to guide inquiry particularly into the interdependencies 
of institutions and collective action situations.  While the IAD framework supports multiple 
theories and models, the framework also supports multiple tools for data collection and analysis.  
One of these tools is the institutional grammar described by Ostrom and Crawford (1995; 2005).  
The purpose of the IGT is to unravel the minute components – analogous to genetic codes in 
living cells – of formal institutions, such as policies, laws, legislation, and regulations. As an 
IAD tool, the institutional grammar shares much of the IAD logic but also offers refined 
definitions for systematically dissecting institutional statements in policy designs.  
For the institutional grammar tool, data are collected on “institutional statements,” which 
are defined as “the shared linguistic constraint or opportunity that prescribes, permits, or advises 
actions or outcomes for actors (both individual and corporate).  Institutional statements are 
spoken, written, or tacitly understood in a form intelligible to actors in an empirical setting.”   In 
the initial version of the institutional grammar tool, institutional statements were composed of 
five working parts: The Attribute (A), Deontic (D), aIm (I), Condition (C), and the Or else (O) 
(Crawford and Ostrom, 1995, 584).   
 From these five working parts, institutional statements could then be identified as 
strategies, norms, and rules. A strategy contains an Attribute, an AIm, and a Condition (AIC), a 
norm contains, in addition, a Deontic (ADIC), and with the addition of a sanction, or an Or else, 
the statement becomes a rule (ADICO). Crawford and Ostrom (1995) articulate this distinction 
between strategies, norms, and rules within the description of the IGT to conceptually mirror the 
distinction applied in the IAD framework more broadly. They argued that such clear 
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categorization of the basic elements that constitute policies is necessary for sound policy 
analysis, and proposed that the grammar can aid analyst in the identification of (i) actions that 
are required, permitted, and forbidden, (ii) the actors assigned to particular activities, (iii) the 
temporal and spatial boundaries in which these activities take place, and, in some cases, (iv) the 
punitive measures associated with non-compliance.  
 However, the language associated with  strategies, norms, and rules distinction within the 
application of the IGT raises issues of concern as all legislative prescriptions may be viewed as 
rules. That is, all legislative prescriptions are assumed to be enforceable by some agents within 
the policy process. As such, this categorization is not applied herein. Instead the authors 
categorize and refer to institutional statements in terms of the grammar components present 
within them. An analysis that assesses the theoretical and practical utility of this conceptual 
distinction when applying the IGT is an area in which more research must be conducted.   
The next section provides a brief definition of each of the grammar components based on 
the original work of Crawford and Ostrom (1995) and later by Basurto et al. (2009).  Table 1 
provides a summary of characteristics for each of the grammar components as well as examples 
from coded policies.  
Insert Table 1. Summarizing Attribute Characteristics 
Attribute 
 The Attribute is the animate agent (e.g. individual, groups of individuals, or 
organization(s), that carries out the aIm.  If the agent includes individuals then the Attribute 
might include descriptions, such as age, sex, or position (Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 141).  For 
organizations, the Attribute might include organizational descriptions, such as organizational size 
(ibid).  The Attribute can be implicit or explicit in any given institutional statement (Basurto et 
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al. 2009). For implicit attributes it is critical that the coder understand the context of the 
statement within the document so as to ensure that an appropriate implication is made. Further, a 
coder may encounter an instance in which agents are nested within larger organizations/groups, 
but only the former, the primary agent, is explicitly stated and the secondary agent may be 
inferred. For example, such an occasion is observed when an actor is a representative or 
employee of an organization and he/she is carrying out an action on behalf of his/her 
organization as a whole. In this case, it might be useful for the coder to know both the nested 
agent in addition to the secondary agent.   
The best way to locate the Attribute of the statement is to identify the actor or 
organization which is expected to carry out the aIm, or goal or action of the statement (Crawford 
and Ostrom 2005, 139). In many cases, the Attribute is most clearly identifiable once one has 
identified the aIm of the statement. By first identifying the aIm, the coder can ensure that there is 
a logical relationship between the Attribute and the action being described in the aIm, that is, it is 
possible for the former to perform the latter.  
Deontic 
 The Deontic is the prescriptive operator of an institutional statement that describes what 
ideally is permitted, obliged, or forbidden (Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 141-149).  The Deontic 
need not always be literally written as the words “permitted”, “obliged”, or “forbidden” but may 
also be presented in other forms, such as may, may not, must, should, must not, should not (ibid). 
Crawford and Ostrom (2005, 144) stated that Deontics must be explicit. However, Basurto et al. 
(2009) found that while the Deontic is usually explicitly stated, it may also be implicit. The 
current paper follows Basurto et al.’s (2009) modification in that Deontics are allowed to be 
implicit because some statements prescribe a command without using the words may, must, or 
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must not. For example, the verb “required” suggests a “must” Deontic. There are also cases in 
which an activity is said to be “prohibited” in legislation, the implication for which would be that 
this activity “must not” occur. Additionally, a Deontic may be carried over, and hence implied, 
from a preceding institutional statement. Deontic operators can vary by prescriptive force, for 
example “must” represents more force than “should” (Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 142-149). 
Deontics serve as useful markers for delineating institutional statements. Coders can start 
separating institutional statements by looking for a Deontic and then proceeding in the following 
coding order: [Deontic] [aIm] [oBject] [Condition] [Or Else]/[Attribute].  
aIm 
  The aIm describes the goal or action of the statement that the Deontic refers to 
(Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 140).  The aIm typically consists of all non-deontic verbs in the 
statement. Any qualifiers of the aIm, including the identification of temporal and spatial 
boundaries relating to the action being discussed, should be included under the Condition. The 
interpretation of the aIm will determine the Attribute and the oBject of the statement. 
Additionally, the aIm may also potentially modify the Deontic. This is particularly applicable in 
cases where the definition of the aIm is inherently vague or when the aIm has multiple 
definitions and thus there is ambiguity about the meaning as applicable to the statement.  
Condition 
 The Condition represents the part of the statement that modifies the aIm, often in 
temporal or spatial terms, but can also include descriptions of how the action identified in the 
aIm is to occur. As such, the condition can be thought of with the operators “when,” “where,” 
and “how” the aIm is allowed, required, or forbidden (Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 149). In other 
words, Conditions set the prerequisites or restrictions on the aIm. It is assumed that Conditions 
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can be explicit or implicit (Basurto et al. 2009). When an institutional statement does not specify 
an explicit Condition nor refer to one implicitly elsewhere, the default value is “at all times” 
(Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 149). An institutional statement may contain multiple conditions, 
so long as they do not comprise statements of their own.    
Or else 
 The Or else operator is the punitive action if the rule is not adhered.  As was done by 
Basurto et al. (2009), the guidelines for coding Or else operators have been relaxed compared to 
the general tenets of the original grammar.  For example, it is not required that the Or else 
operator be backed by another institutional statement for enforcement or the incentives of the 
monitors (Crawford and Ostrom 2005, 150).   The rationale is pragmatic because each 
institutional statement is coded as an individual unit of observation.  The Or else must be 
explicitly stated in order to be coded.     
The Introduction of the oBject  
 Among the more important challenges identified by Basurto et al. (2009) for applying the 
Grammar are (i) uncertainty in identifying the Attribute in the institutional statement; (ii) 
ambiguity regarding how to code statements where the Deontic is implicit rather than explicit, 
and; (iii) difficulty in distinguishing between the aIm and the Conditions. We propose that some 
of these challenges can be ameliorated by the addition of one more syntactic element to the 
grammar: The oBject, which we describe in this section. 
The oBject can be defined as the inanimate or animate part of a statement that is the 
receiver of the action described in the aIm and executed by the agent in the Attribute. For 
example, “The student wrote the paper.” The oBject in this statement would be the paper which 
was written (aIm) by the student (Attribute).    The oBject is often equivalent with the direct 
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object of the sentence, but not in all cases. 
 The oBject code helps avoid ambiguity when interpreting institutional statements when 
there is no explicit Attribute because it helps distinguish the actor (Attribute) from what the actor 
is acting upon (oBject). For example, Table 2 provides a baseline case where there is a clear 
agent (the student) charged with carrying out an aIm (write) on a particular oBject (paper). The 
second example is more challenging to code because the Attribute is implicit and the oBject 
takes the position of the subject of the sentence. Without the oBject the coding would be the 
same for both statements, however, with its’ addition, potential disagreements among coders on 
example two would more likely be avoided. The “paper” in these examples would be the oBject 
because it is the element of the statement to which the Attribute and aIm apply.  The clearest 
cases are when the Attribute is the subject of a sentence and the oBject is the direct object; when 
the sentence is passive, however, the oBject may be mistakenly coded as the Attribute.  Including 
the oBject as part of the syntax reduces the ambiguity and potential for mistakes by clarifying 
that the receiver of the aIm is the oBject and the performer of the aIm is the Attribute.  Table 2 
illustrates the oBject along with the other grammar components. 
Insert Table 2.  Basic Illustration of the oBject Application 
The oBject code is also useful when there are two animate actors in the statement upon 
which the question arises – which one is the Attribute? In the second two examples in Table 2, 
there are two explicitly stated animate actors (student and professor) and there may be some 
ambiguity as to which of the two is the Attribute and which is the oBject. It is desirable to have 
both actors coded as individual components when conducting configuration analyses. For 
example, one may be curious to know how many times a particular actor appears in the 
document and the context in which he/she is discussed, e.g. his/her role in the action situation, 
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the mandated, allowed, and forbidden activities relating to the role, etc. Thus, the oBject is useful 
as it allows the coder to list one of the explicitly stated actors as the Attribute and creates a new 
coding category in which to place the second actor.  
Examples three and four in Table 2 reflect the types of cases that may be encountered by 
coders in which there are two animate actors. Useful strategies for coding such statements 
associated with using the oBject are to remember, again, that that the Attribute of the statement is 
he/she who is expected to perform the aIm, and the oBject is the receiver of the aIm. As such, 
while one example is written actively and the other passively, in both cases, the student 
(Attribute) is to contact (aIm) the professor (oBject).  
 Including the oBject component additionally departs from the current Grammar coding 
format by separating the aIm (action of the statement) from the oBject (receiver of the aIm). 
Here we have limited the contents of the aIm to only include the primary action, or verb, being 
addressed in a particular statement. The advantage of taking this approach allows for the aIm to 
serve as an anchor for the statement, around which all other syntactic components can be 
identified. For example, once one knows the action that is being discussed, he/she can 
systematically identify who is responsible for carrying out the aIm, who or what is the receiver 
of the aIm, under what conditions the aIm should be performed, and the punitive sanctions 
associated with not performing the aIm as prescribed in the directive.  
Summarizing the Utility of oBject 
 Given the previous discussion, it can be argued that the oBject is useful for the following 
reasons. First, the introduction of the oBject minimizes coding ambiguity when dealing with 
statements which lack explicitly stated animate Attributes and provides guidance to coders 
dealing with statements with apparently multiple Attributes as to which is the appropriate 
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Attribute of the statement and which the oBject. Thus, by minimizing coding ambiguity, the 
oBject code enhances the potential for inter-coder reliability. The professor-student examples in 
Table 2 are illustrative of this point. Second, coding the oBject as distinct from the aIm offers a 
clear way to delineate all other [A] [B] [D] [C] [O] components of the statement. Third, the 
inclusion of the oBject is also useful in the data analysis process, particularly when conducting 
analyses where organizing statements by syntactic component is of interest to the analyst. The 
utility of the oBject in this sense allows the coder more possibilities in conducting analyses 
where statement components are more clearly differentiated. It is more likely that the coder 
would choose to organize analyses and conclusions along the oBject, when considering that, in 
most cases, the oBject is synonymous with the direct object of the sentence and thus an integral 
element of the statement.  
Coding Guidelines  
  The following general coding guidelines are a refinement of those developed by Basurto 
et al. (2009) to code institutional statements. Our modifications are based on the experience of 
coders in applying the oBject. The general purpose of these guidelines is to offer scholars using 
this tool a way to reliably parcel institutional statements, a useful task to understand thoroughly 
and systematically the content of policies and identify theoretically and practically useful 
relationships between the elements presented within them (Speer 2008), or to develop 
computational models where agents have the capability to endogenously create or react to 
different rules (Smajgl et al. 2008).   
(1) Identify all definitions, titles, preambles, and headings and disregard them for coding 
purposes.  Titles and headings are first discarded because they are fairly easy to locate and 
rarely constitute an institutional statement of theoretical or practical interest. 
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(2) Identify sections and subsections of the bill as initial units of observation. We call 
headers of sections and subsections as “outline indicators.”  Outline indicators are titles, 
subheadings, a capital or lowercase letters, colons, semicolons, or Roman numerals, used to 
separate sections from subsections and subsections from sub-subsections, etc. These initial units 
of observation are temporary and may be divided into additional units. 
(3) Subdivide all initial section or subsection units from step 2 that have multiple sentences 
into sentence-based units of observation.  If a section or subsection does not have a complete 
sentence ending in a period, code the entire section or subsection as one unit of observation.  If 
there are multiple sentences in the section or subsection, code each sentence as units of 
observation.   
(4)  Code the units of observation following the ABDICO syntax.  The text in each unit is 
coded with respect to the Attribute, oBject, Deontic, aIm, Condition, and Or else. You may have 
more than one Attribute or aIm in the same statement. For example, if you have more than one 
Attribute for which all other syntactic components are identical, multiple Attributes may be 
included in the same statement.  
Example: “A permittee or operator shall give an invoice to the person receiving viable fish or 
gametes at the time of transfer of possession.”  
 
Additionally, if you have more than one aIm for which all other syntactic components are 
identical then multiple aIms may be included in one statement.  
Example: “The Fish Health Board shall review or initiate and consider every rule which relates 
to fish health.” (Fish Health Board Rules) 
 
 If, however, you have more than one aIm and more than one Attribute or oBject, then the 
statement should be broken up so that each Attribute is distinctly assigned to each of the aIms 
being discussed. 
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Example: “The Fish Health Board shall exercise its powers and perform its duties…” (Fish 
Health Board Rules)    Statement 1  Statement 2 
 
Further, if you have two aIms for the same Attribute or oBject but there are multiple conditions 
that comprise multiple institutional statements, then the statements should be broken up based on 
the aIm and relevant Conditions. 
Example: “Facility owners shall annually complete and submit a permit renewal application and 
all submissions shall be mailed by December 31st.  
 
Statement 1: Facility owners shall annually complete and submit a permit renewal application.  
   
A    D C         I
1    
I
2        
B 
Statement 2: All submissions shall be mailed [facility owners] by December 31st.  
   B  
   
D      I                        A        C
  
 
15 
 
(5) Code statements according to components present.  In our exercise, we separated 
statements into AIC/ABIC, ADIC/ABDIC, and ADICO/ABDICO categories. 
(6) When applicable, imply components when they are not explicitly provided in the 
statement. In some cases, the Attribute is missing because the statement under consideration is 
actually an extension of the statement prior to it in the document. In this case, the coder should 
use the Attribute from the previous statement. In other cases, an Attribute will not be obvious, 
and thus an implication should be made by identifying the logical actor associated with 
performing the specified aIm. Sometimes in legislative documents, the agent who is requiring 
that the action being discussed in the statement be carried out may be the Attribute. In some 
cases the Deontic can also be implicitly stated, as when some statements prescribe a command 
without using the words may, must or must not. For the Condition component, unless stated 
otherwise in preceding statements, the default Condition will be “at all times,” meaning that the 
directive is applicable in all cases unless an exception is explicitly stated.  
(7) Multiple coders for inter-coder reliability. As with all coding applications, each document 
should be coded by multiple coders to ensure that data collected through the coding process is 
done so reliably across all coders. Coding methods should be iteratively revised until a desirable 
agreement percentage is met.  Inter-subjective reliability should be discussed communally among 
the team of coders as each team will encounter difficult cases unique to the type(s) of 
document(s) being coded.  
Case Study: Colorado State Aquaculture 
 We illustrate the operationalization of the grammar of institutions and its potential for 
policy analysis through an empirical application to all of the major laws that guide aquaculture 
activities in Colorado State. Aquaculture is defined as, “the farming of organisms that live in 
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water, such as fish, shellfish, and algae (USGS, 1996).” Aquaculture is a relevant national and 
state-level policy analysis issue given that it is one of the fastest growing food commodities 
(Naylor et al., 2001), and its governance is embedded in a complex regulatory framework.  
The decrease of fish stocks in capture fisheries has served as a primary impetus to grow 
the U.S. aquaculture industry to meet increasing consumer demand (Boyd, 2003). Regulatory 
concerns relating to aquaculture include water pollution from farm effluent, competitive feed 
pricing, and silting issues in federal and state waters (Ackefors et al., 1994). The regulation of 
aquaculture activities occurs at multiple levels—local, state, regional, and federal—and is 
conducted by a number of different agencies at each geographic scale (McDaniels et al., 2006, 
426). The decentralization of regulatory responsibilities has meant that different stakeholders 
with varying objectives are involved at each level to decide how and when the aquaculture 
industry is regulated.  
 In the early 1990’s the Colorado aquaculture industry formally requested to be 
incorporated into the jurisdiction of the Colorado Department of Agriculture, thus conferring the 
rights and responsibilities associated with other types of agricultural activities in the State upon 
it. A new set of laws and regulations were created to address this jurisdictional change. This 
study seeks to understand some of these rules and regulations by systematically coding the 
institutions presented within them.  
 The two primary agencies charged with the regulation of aquaculture in Colorado State 
are the Colorado Department of Agriculture (CDoA) and the Colorado Division of Wildlife 
(CDoW). The CDoA is responsible for permitting procedures relating to aquaculture and has two 
complementary legislative documents: the Colorado Aquaculture Act (CAA) Statue and the 
Rules Pertaining to the Administration and Enforcement of the Colorado Aquaculture Act, that 
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detail the structure and responsibilities of the Aquaculture Board, procedural directives regarding 
destruction orders and all other permits and regulations present within the legislation, and the fee 
structure assigned to different permit types.  
The CDoW deals with matters of fish health and has two legislative documents that deal 
directly with aquaculture. The first (Article VII of the Chapter 00 – General Provisions) specifies 
prescribed fish health testing, responsibilities of the State Fish Health Pathologist, and 
disinfection and quarantine procedures. The second (Section 33-5.5-101 of Title 33 of the 
Wildlife and Parks and Regulations Rules) outlines the responsibilities of the Fish Health Board 
as they pertain to aquaculture. 
 Taken together there are four legislative documents governing aquaculture activities in 
Colorado: the Colorado Aquaculture Act (i.e. CAA Statue), the CAA Administration and 
Enforcement Rules (i.e. Rules Pertaining to the Administration and Enforcement of the Colorado 
Aquaculture Act), Article VII of the Chapter 00 Regulations (herein Chapter 0), and the Fish 
Health Board Statute (Section 33-5.5-101 of Title 33). We coded each of these in their entirety 
for our analysis.  
Results 
Inter-coder Reliability  
One of the major challenges found by Basurto et al. (2009) in operationalizing the 
grammar was to identify reliably Attributes and Conditions from other syntactic components. To 
assess the effectiveness of our coding guidelines and whether the addition of a new syntactic 
component—the oBject—contributed to address this challenge we conducted a test of inter-coder 
reliability on three different pieces of legislation. First, we coded 35 statements from the 
Colorado Aquaculture Act Administration and Enforcement Rules, constituting approximately 
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10% of the total statements coded across all four documents. The results from this test are 
included in Table 3 and show at least 80 percent agreement was found between coders for all 
components. Next, we coded 10 statements from the transportation and abortion legislation 
coded in Basurto et al. (2009), five for each and constituting 50% of the total statements 
previously coded by them, to determine if the addition of the oBject code contributed to a higher 
rate of agreement between coders across statement components. Special attention was given to 
observing a higher agreement rate on Attributes and Conditions. The results from this test are 
also included in Table 3 and show that, indeed, though not entirely resolving the issues, the 
inclusion of the oBject code increased inter-coder reliability for both fields.   
Table 3 shows a reduction in ambiguity in the coding of all syntactic components of the 
grammar.  
Insert Table 3. Comparison of Inter-Coder Reliability Test Results 
While the inter-coder reliability rates were comparably higher than those obtained by 
Basurto et al., (2009), our results still show most disagreement when coding Attributes, 
Conditions and the oBject. Disagreements took place when coders failed to parse similar 
institutional statements and when coders failed to carefully assess whether certain words 
constituted descriptors of the oBject (in which case they would be included in the oBject field) or 
modifiers of the aIm (in which case they would need to be included in the Condition field). We 
acknowledge that there is always going to be some disagreement between coders due to the 
inherent vagueness of language. However, we find that most coding disagreements can be 
prevented when the coder is well acquainted with the context of the bill and the coder is able to 
carefully determine the aIm and from it: who carries out the aIm? (i.e. the Attribute), who or 
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what is the receiver of the action described in the aIm? (i.e. the oBject) and how, when, where, or 
if the aIm is modified? (i.e. the Condition).4  
Descriptive Results 
First, we conducted a basic frequency count for all four policy documents to determine 
the total number of statements within each document and categorize them by components 
present. Table 4 shows the results of the initial descriptive analysis.  
Insert Table 4. Summarizing Institutional Statements 
 Descriptive information such as the displayed in Table 4 is useful to identify potentially 
interesting trends and tendencies in the data. In our case, for instance, it draws attention to the 
fact that in comparison with all other pieces of legislation, the CAA Administration and 
Enforcement Rules contain a proportionally high number of institutional statements containing 
only Attributes, Aims, and Conditions, (30%), that is, statements without a Deontic (the 
prescriptive operator that describes what ideally is permitted, obliged, or forbidden) and Or else 
(the punitive sanction associated with non-compliance with the policy directive). For example, 
“Amendments to these rules are proposed for adoption by the Commissioner of the Colorado 
Department of Agriculture.” (CAA Rules) This finding might warrant further inquiry for the 
analyst about the particulars of the institutional statements that conform it. Among others, a 
potentially interesting question for the analyst to pursue might be: What are the reasons an 
                                                           
4
 It is our position that it will be up to individual teams of coders to clarify coding guidelines regarding each of the 
statement components to suit their coding needs and objectives to achieve a suitable agreement percentage for their 
purposes. Our primary objective in conducting an inter-coder reliability test was to ensure that our data was 
collected based upon reliable methods and guidelines. Data collection was completed in accordance with coding 
rules and strategies previously articulated by the other scholars and further developed based upon our own coding 
experiences (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Basurto et al, 2009). The selection of coding criteria is not meant to 
express normative evaluations and/or biases of the data by the authors. Such normative considerations arise in the 
interpretation of the data and reflect the epistemological biases of the researchers. 
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agency devoted to administration contains relatively few guidelines describing what is permitted, 
obliged or forbidden?  
Further, Table 4 indicates that there is only one institutional statement containing all 
Grammar components in the sample of policy documents (CAA Statute). This finding is 
consistent with Basurto et al.’s (2009). However, when applying the grammar to the study of 
legislation the lack of Or else in a statement does not suffice to conclude that no punitive 
measures are associated with non-compliance. Given the nested quality of legislation, higher 
level governmental and/or agency level policies likely discuss the punitive measures that are to 
be taken against those who fail to comply with policy directives.  
 Next, for the four policy documents we also conducted a frequency count to determine 
the three Attributes, oBjects, and Deontics most frequently occurring within each. Conditions 
were not included within this analysis because this field contained a lot of information that 
varied significantly between statements. Thus information within this field was not amenable to 
systematic compartmentalization.  Or elses were not included due to the rarity of their 
occurrence in the legislation coded.   A frequency count of aIms was conducted, but due to the 
high amount of variability between statements, the results are not presented here. Table 4 also 
provides a summary of these descriptive analyses of Attributes, oBjects, and Deontics.  
A preliminary overview of Table 4 allows one to begin to compare and contrast the scope 
of the four policies.  With regard to policy actors, the Colorado Aquaculture Act, for example, 
depicts actors such as the Colorado Aquaculture Board and the Commissioner of Agriculture as 
having primary regulatory and implementation authority. As these two documents originate from 
the same agency, the Colorado Administration and Enforcement Rules were also likely to 
include the Colorado Department of Agriculture but additionally include aquaculture facility 
  
 
21 
 
owners and operators.  A basic comparison of Attributes thus highlights the primary actors 
involved in the implementation process and hints at the relative authority that actors have in 
making decisions that shape aquaculture action situations. Also observable in Table 4 is insight 
into the intent of the actions shaped by the legislation through the modal oBjects. oBjects 
illuminate the focal points of regulatory processes and procedures that policy actors are 
associated with.  
Where many oBjects are prescribed to single actors, an implication may be made that 
his/her scope of activities constitute a wide range, thus signaling more involvement in the 
aquaculture arena. The converse may also be implied. For example, the oBjects related to the 
Commission of Agriculture relate primarily to dealing with aquaculture rules and permit 
requirements, thus implying that this actor’s scope of activities involves a higher level 
management of aquaculture related issues limited to a few specific areas. This contrasts with 
facility owners and operators who are associated with wide range of oBjects from fish health 
testing, to administrative procedures, to facility management techniques. This comparison is 
assumed to be a generally accurate representation regarding the involvement of modal actors in 
the aquaculture industry, for while the aquaculture constitutes only one of the agricultural areas 
with which the Commissioner deals, aquaculture for a facility owner likely is his/her primary 
daily activity.   
In summarizing the modal Attributes, oBjects, and Deontics within each of policy 
documents in this manner, one may begin to discern how individual components from 
institutional statements cumulatively structure action situations described within policies 
(Ostrom, 2005, 175). Within each policy document one may observe who are the primary 
participants, and various characteristics regarding them, including, for example, the activities 
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associated with them and the control that their respective positions afford.  The data may then be 
used to derive empirically testable questions. Examples of questions include: To what extent do 
Deontics signal the discretionary authority of modal actors? How do Attributes and oBjects 
relate to one another and what do these relationships imply about the scope of authority and/or 
responsibility of modal Attributes? Because the information gleaned from such tables is limited, 
however, one should conduct additional types of configuration analyses to uncover additionally 
meaningful trends and tendencies.  
Configuration Analysis 
Insert Figure 1. Configuration Analysis 
To illustrate the analytic potential of the institutional grammar Figure 1 shows (1) how 
political actors and organizations are linked across levels analysis around shared processes (Kiser 
and Ostrom, 2000); and (2) maps these processes, through the identification and configuration of 
components, in order to understand how they are intended to guide the behavior of actors 
through outlining "strategic options and role expectations” (Kiser and Ostrom, 2000,6). As a 
result the analyst may observe a) how different coded components are linked to animate a 
particular Attribute’s behavior regarding a prescribed political process; b) how Attributes 
themselves are linked in relation to policy directed processes, in terms of both their individual 
and organizational interactions; and c) what are the policy procedures associated with modal 
Attributes in relation to levels of analysis? A discussion of each of these in relation to Figure 1 is 
provided below.  
 a) Mapping how different components of the institutional grammar structure opportunities 
and constraints to different policy actors (i.e., Attributes). 
 
 In order to determine how policy related actors are expected to act, one must first know 
who the primary actors are whose behavior policies are intended to shape. In Figure 1, the modal 
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Attribute from each of the legislation examined is represented in the left hand column. The 
Commissioner of Agriculture is from the Colorado Aquaculture Act Statute (CDoA), the 
Colorado Department of Agriculture is from the Colorado Aquaculture Act Administration and 
Enforcement Rules (CDoA), the Fish Health Board is from the Fish Health Board Rules 
(CDoW), and Facility Owners and/or Operators are from the Chapter 0 Regulations (CDoW). 
Each of these Attributes is discussed in relation to the oBject most frequently occurring across 
the two Attributes in the two legislative documents for each of the respective agencies. For 
instance the oBject “Aquaculture Permits” is implemented by two different actors or Attributes: 
the Colorado Department of Agriculture and the Commissioner of Agriculture. These Attributes 
determine the total possible aIms that must, must not, or may be performed in relation to the 
oBject. Following this example, on the one hand, the Colorado Department of Agriculture must 
not deny an aquaculture permit for local and non-threatening species, but may also deny or limit 
an application for an aquaculture permit or its renewal, or must expire facility permits on 
December 31st or each year, to name just three of seven different institutional arrangements that 
the Colorado Department of Agriculture is capable of as related to aquaculture permits. On the 
other hand, the Commissioner of Agriculture can also issue directives related to the same object, 
“aquaculture permits” i.e., may withhold, deny, or revoke aquaculture permits, or must provide 
for the issuance of permits or must establish permit fees. Note that it is through this mapping that 
one can understand how statement components relate to one another in structuring the 
opportunities, constraints, apparent contradictions and potential for conflict among modal actors 
vis-à-vis policy directives.  
b) Uncovering institutional diversity 
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 By anchoring Attributes and aIms around a shared oBject as done in Figure 1, we 
demonstrate how one oBject may formally appear in a variety of action situations as prescribed 
by the various policies and involving multiple actors, organizations, and processes; that is, the 
various opportunities and constraints available to actors via prescribed processes and related 
prescriptive operators in relation to a particular oBject. Such a depiction segues to a host of 
analytical possibilities. For example, one can explore the networks of actors associated with an 
oBject. Additionally, one may also consider how these actors’ individual and organizational 
affiliations shape how they interact with the relevant oBject. 
 For example, in the bottom half of Figure 1, the oBject depicted is “Quarantine Orders.” 
The two actors portrayed in relation to quarantine orders are the Fish Health Board, the members 
of which are formally opportuned with “Approving destruction and quarantine orders,” and 
Facility Owners and/or Operator who complementarily “Have the right to appeal all disinfection 
and quarantine orders.” Not only does this demonstrate the opportunities available to each of the 
actors relating to a shared oBject, but the ways in which they may interact in an action situation 
concerning quarantine orders.     
c) Linking Attributes through different levels of analysis 
 
 Mapping legislation as in Figure 1 might be theoretically useful to an analyst interested in 
determining actors’ constraints and opportunities at different levels of analysis. As Kiser and 
Ostrom (2000) write: "At each level individual and collective choice is constrained to some 
range of strategic options. The point of this demarcation of levels is to highlight some 
fundamental similarities among political processes at different levels of analysis. At each level 
actors confront an action situation with strategic options and role expectations as defined at 
  
 
25 
 
higher levels, and the choice of actors at one level jointly produce patterns of interactions and 
outcomes." (Kiser and Ostrom, 2000, 6).   
 The level of analysis at which the Attributes’ prescribed responsibilities are understood to 
occur is shown to the right hand side of the configuration analysis for each actor, and is 
displayed as either being the “Collective Choice Level” or “Operational Choice Level.” The 
decision regarding which level to place the respective Attributes at is determined by observing 
the types of aIms associated with each actor. This discussion is not to imply that actors only act 
at one level of decision making, but rather to showcase how their roles and responsibilities at 
different levels are formalized within policy designs. For example, most of the tasks associated 
with the Colorado Department of Agriculture and the Commissioner of Agriculture represent 
activities that would shape the structure of activities dealing with aquaculture permits at an 
operational level; the former assigned such duties as “issuing permits” and “applying the most 
restrictive state/federal for permitting,” and the latter with “establishing permit fees” and 
“providing for the issuance of permits.” Since these activities can be understood to shape rules 
that structure activities at the operational level, each of these Attributes are assumed to work 
primarily at a collective choice level.  Similarly the Fish Health Board is also charged with tasks 
associated with the collective choice level such as “approving all destruction and quarantine 
orders” and “reviewing destruction or quarantine regulations.” Conversely, facility owners are 
evidently not in a position to determine the structure of administering quarantine orders, however 
they do “have the right to appeal” them. As such, it is determined that facility owners affect 
quarantine orders within action situations at the operation level. 
Conclusion 
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 The application of the IGT provided herein illustrates a systematic approach to 
identifying the basic elements of a policy design and features a configuration analysis to 
demonstrate how minute elements of policies may be aggregated and configured to uncover 
useful practical and theoretical relationships.  From the analysis of each policy document, we 
gained insight into the various ways that these policies seek to structure the activities of 
aquaculture participants in Colorado State. A next step is to arrange coded information in terms 
of specific types of action situation variables that statements are meant to affect. That is, how 
statements articulate the comparable positions of these participants, how individuals arrive at 
these positions, and what they may or may not do once they are there.  
This paper contributes to the emerging study of the application of Crawford and Ostrom’s 
institutional grammar by introducing the oBject.  The oBject is incorporated into the institutional 
grammar and coding guidelines are clarified to address challenges posed by Basurto et al. (2009). 
The first of these challenges deals with conceptually defining the Attribute. In past applications 
the Attribute was defined as “to whom or what the institutional applies.” With the inclusion of 
the oBject a clear distinction is made regarding who is expected to carry out the aIm (Attribute) 
and who or what is expected to receive the aIm (oBject). In addition, by limiting the definition of 
the aIm to only include the non-Deontic verb of the statement, ambiguity concerning the 
distinction between the aIm and the Condition is reduced. In the revised definition, one or few 
verbs should be included in the aIm, and all modifiers should be included in the Condition field.  
  The configuration analysis (Figure 1) facilitates a discussion of the ways in which such 
analyses may uncover theoretical relationships of interest. While the analysis was guided by the 
IAD framework, scholars need not restrict the application of the IGT to the theoretical logic of 
the IAD. The institutional grammar offers a methodological tool for collecting data to 
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systematically understand the content of policy design. The theoretical analysis and 
interpretation of the data may be informed by a wide variety of policy process models, theories, 
and/or frameworks. For example, scholars applying the social construction framework may find 
it most useful to configure the coded data around sanctions, or Or else components, in relation to 
different actors presented in the policy document to understand how benefits and burdens are 
formalized across different policies (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). Further, data could be 
configured to support the application of agent based models that seek to understand how policies 
shape actors’ individual and aggregated decision making behaviors (Janssen, 2005; Smajgl et al. 
2008). The advocacy coalition framework predicts that policies are but the translation of beliefs; 
thus, this grammar provides a means for linking coalition beliefs to institutions (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993).  Moreover, the IGT could aid any theory of policy change to understand 
how institutions evolve over time.  In IAD guided research, the IGT could be used to assess the 
extent of congruence between rules-in-form and rules-in-use thereby providing insight into 
effective monitoring and enforcement as well as effective implementation. 
 For those who do wish to study coded data from the perspective of the IAD framework, 
however, future research using the IGT should elaborate upon theoretical issues that we address 
in our analysis. Namely, this involves exploring the two analytical approaches we proffer to 
develop theoretically motivated questions. To reiterate, these two approaches, include: (1) 
mapping political processes or procedures associated with modal Attributes in relation to levels 
of analysis; and (2) demonstrating how different coded components are linked to animate a 
particular Attribute’s behavior regarding a prescribed political process. Additionally, future 
research could consider supplementing legislative coding with other forms of data collection 
methods such as interviews or a questionnaire to test empirical questions derived from 
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relationships identified in coded data; for example, interviewing policy relevant actors in the 
action situations to understand how they are interpreting policy directives and, further, which 
statement components are most influential in shaping their interpretation.  
 Understanding the content and interactions of policy designs has puzzled researchers for 
decades.   The challenge is that policy designs are composed of elements traced from prior 
politics with nontrivial interdependencies resulting in outputs and outcomes; that is, policy 
designs can be thought of as complex systems (Simon, 1996).  In complex systems, boundaries 
and scales are artificial, requiring both simplifying assumptions and cross-scale theorizing.  The 
initial move in studying complex systems is to identify and define the elementary elements of the 
system both reliably and validly, for faulty description precludes explanation. The next move is 
to configure those elements to present a simplified depiction of the system and then to answer 
research questions, to test hypotheses, or both.   While not attempted in this paper, the end goal is 
to link the elements and the configuration of elements to a broader system of actors, physical and 
material conditions, community characteristics, and, especially, the political processes that 
created the policy design and the political processes that proceed from the policy design.    
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Table 1. Summarizing Institutional Grammar Characteristics 
1. Attribute Characteristic and Example from Coded Legislation 
• Must be an animate actor 
 
“A qualified fish health pathologist shall inspect all facilities annually.” 
• May be explicit or  implicit “Fish health inspections shall be conducted annually [by a qualified fish health 
pathologist]*.” 
 
• Must include all relevant descriptors “The fish health board shall meet annually.”Descriptors = “fish health” 
• Attribute must logically be able to perform 
aIm 
“The Commissioner shall enforce all rules and regulations concerning 
aquaculture except those which relate to fish health.”  
 
2. Deontic Characteristic and Example from Coded Legislation 
• The prescriptive operator of an institutional 
statement that describes what is permitted, 
obliged, or forbidden 
“The Aquaculture Board shall annually select a chairperson.”  
 
• Usually explicit, but may also be implicit 
 
“The Board is authorized to recommend rules to the Commissioner.”  
Implied Deontic = may 
3. aIm Characteristic and Example from Coded Legislation 
• Describes the goal or action of the statement, 
i.e. usually the verb of the statement.  
“Director of the Division may approve destruction orders.” 
 
 
• Any qualifiers of the aIm, including the 
identification of temporal and spatial 
boundaries, should be included in the 
Condition.  
 
“The aquaculture board shall annually select a chairperson and vice 
chairperson.” 
 aIm = “select” 
Condition = “annually” 
* = “[ ]” designate that statement has been implied. 
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Table 1. Summarizing Institutional Grammar Characteristics (continued) 
4. Condition Characteristic and Example from Coded Legislation 
• Includes all qualifiers of the aIm, including 
when, where, and how the action in the aIm is 
to be performed 
 
“Applications for exemption shall be submitted to the Director at least 60 days 
prior to any proposed stocking.”  
• Default implicit conditions is “at all times” “All aquaculture facility permits must be certified [at all times].” 
• Institutional statements may contain multiple 
conditions 
“Exemptions granted by the Director shall be valid unless the applicant fails to 
comply with the terms of the exemption or fails to submit an annual report.” 
Condition 1 = “…unless the applicant fails to comply with the terms of the 
exemption…” 
Condition 2 = “…fails to submit an annual report…” 
5. Or else Characteristic and Example from Coded Legislation 
• The punitive action if the directive is not 
followed.  
“Any person that violates the provisions of this article shall be fined no less 
than one thousand dollars and no more than five thousand dollars.” 
* = “[ ]” designate that statement has been implied. 
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Table 2.  Basic Illustration of the oBject Application. 
 Statement Coding 
Example One  The student must write 
paper by date or receive a 
lower final grade.    
A = student 
B = paper 
D = must  
I = write 
C = by date 
O = or receive a lower final 
grade 
Example Two  Paper must be written by 
date or receive a lower 
final grade. 
A = [Implied] student 
B = paper 
D = must 
I = be written 
C = by date 
O = or receive a lower final 
grade 
Example Three  Student must contact the 
professor by date or 
receive a lower final 
grade.   
A = student 
B = professor 
D = must  
I = contact 
C = by date 
O = or receive a lower final 
grade 
Example Four Professor must be 
contacted by the student 
by date or receive a 
lower final grade. 
A = student 
B = professor 
D = must  
I = contact 
C = by date 
O = or receive a lower final 
grade 
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Table 3. Comparison of Inter-Coder Reliability Test Results 
Syntactic Component Agreement 
between coders 
for Colorado 
aquaculture 
legislation (%) 
Average agreement 
between coders for 
transportation and 
abortion legislation 
coded with addition of 
oBject* 
Average agreement 
between coders for 
transportation and 
abortion legislation coded 
in Basurto et al. (2009) 
(%) 
Attribute 86 90 82 
oBject 86 80 NA 
Deontic 97 90 89 
aIm 94 90 92 
Condition 80 80 67 
Or else 100 100 100 
* Two experienced grammar coders participated in this effort. One had participated in the coding 
of the Colorado aquaculture legislation and the other in the previous coding done in Basurto et 
al. (2009). 
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Table 4. Summarizing Institutional Statements 
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CAA Statute CAA Admin & 
Enforcement
Chapter 0 Fish Health Board 
Statute
Number of AIC/ABIC Statements 2 16 8 1
Number of ADIC/ABDIC 
Statements
56 38 185 39
Number of ADICO/ABDICO 
Statements
1 0 0 0
Total Institutional Statements 59 54 193 40
1. Commissioner of 
Agriculture (16)
1. Colorado Dept. of 
Agriculture (24) 
1. Facility Owners 
and/or Operators (52)
1. Fish Health Board -- 
Collective (14)
2. Aquaculture Board 
(14)
2. Aquaculture 
Permittees (13)
2. Qualified Fish 
Health Pathologist (43)
2. Director of the 
Division of Wildlife 
(10) 
3. Colorado General 
Assembly (7)
3. Facility Owners 
and/or Operators (6)
3. Possesor of Live 
Aquatic Wildlife (30)
3. Fish Health Board 
Members -- Individuals 
(9)
1. Rules and 
Regulations (5)
1. Aquaculture Facility 
Permit (11)
1. Triploid Grass Carp 
(7)
1. Fish Health Board 
Members (7)
2. Aquaculture Facility 
Permit (4)
2. Purpose of the 
Propossed Regulations 
(8) 
2. Applications for 
Exemptions (5)
2. Rules (5)
3. Suspensions or 
Revocations of 
Aquaculture Facility 
Permits and Powers of 
the Board (3) 
3. Aquaculture 
Permittee Records (4)
3. Dikes, Diploid Grass 
Carp, Fish, Fish Health 
Certification, and 
Whirling Disease 
Management Plan (4)
3. Destruction Orders 
(4)
Must (35) Must (24) Must (137) Must (36)
Must Not (6) Must Not (9) Must Not (13) Must Not (1) 
May (16) May (4) May (32) May (1) 
May Not (0) May Not (1) May Not (3) May Not (0)
Deontics (Number of Occurrences 
in Legislation)
Colorado Dept of Agriculture Colorado Dept of Wildlife
Modal Attributes (Number of 
Occurrences in Legislation)
Model Objects (Number of 
Occurrences in Legislation)
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Figure 1. Configuration Analysis 
 
 
